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The  Determinants  of  Fair  Value  Measurements  of  Banks:  International  Evidence 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the accounting choice decisions of banks to employ 
Level 3 inputs in estimating the value of their financial assets and liabilities. Using a sample of 
146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 2009-2012, this   study   finds   banks’  
incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs are associated with both firm-level and country-level 
determinants. At the firm-level, leverage, profitability (in term of net income), Tier 1 capital 
ratio, size and audit committee independence are associated with the percentage of Level 3 
valuation inputs. At the country-level, economy development, legal region, legal enforcement 
and investor rights are also associated with the  Level  3  classification  choice.  Lastly,  ‘secrecy’,  
the proxy for culture dimensions and values, is found to be positively associated with the use of 
Level 3 valuation inputs. Altogether, these findings suggest that banks use the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs opportunistically to avoid violating debt covenants limits, to 
increase earnings and manage their capital ratios. Results of this study also highlight that 
corporate governance quality at the firm-level (e.g. audit committee independence) and 
institutional   features   can   constrain   banks’   opportunistic   behaviors   in using the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs. The results of this study have important implications for 
standard setters and contribute to the debate on the use of fair value accounting in an 
international context. 
 
 
 
Key words: Fair value measurement; Fair value hierarchy; Accounting choice 
JEL classification: M40, M41 
 
 
1 
The  Determinants  of  Fair  Value  Measurements  of  Banks:  International  Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
The  choices  with  respect  to  the  requirements  of  fair  value  measurement  to  disclose  a  fair  value  
hierarchy  provides  an  opportunity  for  an  accounting  choice  study.  As Ball (2006) highlights 
that a major feature of IFRS accounting standards is the extent of the use of fair value 
accounting. A consequence of the enhanced use of fair value accounting,  in  particular  ‘mark-to 
model’ rather  than  ‘mark-to-market’,  is the  ‘discretionary’ nature of fair value accounting in 
specific contexts. In particular, the implication of fair value accounting requires very specific 
conditions such as well-developed and liquid capital markets. Under IFRS 13 Fair Value 
Measurement, the definition of fair value1 emphasises that if the liquid markets do not exist for 
orderly transactions, then fair values have to be measured based on managerial assumptions 
and models (e.g. Level 3 inputs).  IFRS  13  seeks  to  “increase  consistency  and  comparability  in  
fair value measurements and related disclosures through a 'fair value hierarchy'. The hierarchy 
categorises the inputs used in valuation techniques into three levels. The hierarchy gives the 
highest priority to (unadjusted) quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities 
and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs. [IFRS 13:72]” 
As part of the IASB's response to the global financial crisis and convergence project 
between IFRS and FASB, in   March   2009,   the   IASB   issued Improving   Disclosures   about  
Financial   Instruments   (Amendments   to   IFRS  7 Financial   Instruments:  Disclosures).   IFRS 7 
requires reporting entities to disclose the fair values based on a ‘Three-Level’ hierarchy in 
                                                             
1  Fair value is defined as ‘the  price  that  would  be  received  to  sell  an  asset  or  paid  to  transfer  a  liability  in  an  
orderly transaction between market participants at  the  measurement  date.’ 
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order to provide financial statements users with useful information about valuations, 
methodologies and the uncertainty associated with fair value measurements. Level 1 and 2 
measurements include observable and indirectly observable inputs such as quoted prices of 
identical or comparable assets or liabilities from active markets. However, Level 3 
measurements include unobservable inputs computed  by  using  price  models  or  discounted  cash  
flow  methodologies  or  other   information   reflecting   reporting   entity’s  own  assumptions   and  
judgments.  As fair value estimates based on Level 3 inputs are uncertain, IFRS 7 requires 
entities to reconcile fair value measurements in Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy from the 
beginning balances to the ending balances on their realised and unrealised gains or losses. Also, 
any significant transfer between different levels must be disclosed. 
The  empirical  results  generally  confirm  that  managers  use  the  discretion  provided  by  fair  
value  accounting  opportunistically  to  increase  the  performance  and  cash  flows  (Chong,  Huang  
&  Zhang,   2012;;   Fiechter  &  Meryer,   2009   and  Henry,   2009),   to   smooth   earnings   volatility  
(Barth   et   al.,   1995;;  Hodder   et   al.,   2006  and   Li  &  Sloan,  2011),   to  meet   analysts’   forecasts  
(Song,2008   and   Fargher   &   Zhang,   2012)   and   to   increase   management’s   compensations  
(Ramanna  &  Watts,   2009;;  Dechow  et   al.,   2010;;   Shalev,  Zhang  &  Zhang,   2010   and  Livne,  
Markarian  &  Milne,  2011). Barth and Taylor (2010) call for more research to investigate the 
role of discretion in fair value estimates. Using the language of the fair value measurement 
hierarchy, Level 3 inputs are discretionary in nature. However, the incentives of bankers to use 
Level 3 inputs remain an empirical question. 
Using a sample that comprises 146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 
2009-2012, this study investigates the firm-level and country-level factors that explain 
 
 
3 
managers’   incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs. This study focuses on banks because 
banks   have   significant   amounts   of   fair   value   assets   and   liabilities and they are among the 
strongest critics from 2008 global financial crisis. Regressing on 146 bank-year observations 
from the largest 50 non-US banks, this study finds that firm-level, country-level and culture 
factors are associated with banker’s  classification choices on fair value measurements. At the 
firm-level, this study provides evidence that leverage and size are significantly and positively 
associated with the percentage of Level 3 inputs for valuing assets and liabilities. Furthermore, 
this study finds that better performing banks, measured by net income, are less likely to use 
Level 3 inputs. Moreover, the capital adequacy management incentive partially explains the 
choice of using Level 3 inputs. That is, banks with comparatively low Tier 1 capital ratios are 
more likely to measure their financial assets and liabilities based on Level 3 inputs. Results also 
provide  evidence  on  the  influence  of  corporate  governance  on  the  banks’  incentives  to  employ  
Level 3 valuation inputs, showing that audit committee independence is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of using Level 3 inputs. 
Consistent with the evidence of LaPorta et al., (1998)2, at the country-level, this study finds 
that economic development ( measured by per-capital GDP), common law legal system, legal 
enforcement, outsider investor rights are all negatively associated with the percentage of Level 
3 inputs for valuing assets and liabilities. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that culture 
dimensions also explains the bankers’   choice to use Level 3 inputs. Using   Grey   (1998)’s  
culture values scores, this study provide evidence that banks from countries that are more 
‘secrecy’- oriented are more likely to use Level 3 inputs. Altogether, these firm-level and 
                                                             
2  LaPorta et al., (1998) provide early evidence that countries with English common law legal systems tend to have: 
(1) better economic development and stronger capital markets, (2) stronger investor rights and (3) better legal 
enforcement as compared to code law countries. 
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country-level determinants suggest that banks use the discretion available when using Level 3 
inputs opportunistically. Additionally, because of the subjective nature of Level 3 inputs, banks 
are able to use Level 3 inputs to boost earnings and manage their capital ratios. Results of this 
study also show that corporate governance quality at the firm-level (e.g. audit committee 
independence) and institutional features can  constrain  banks’  opportunistic  behaviors  through  
Level 3 inputs. All results remain unchanged in robustness tests. 
The results contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, the results can be used 
as an input into the debate on the role of fair value accounting. Prior studies focus on the value 
relevance of Level 3 inputs (Song et al., 2010) without exploring the potential managerial 
incentives to use Level 3 inputs. This study fills the gap and adds to the body of knowledge on 
accounting choice literature in the context of fair value measurements. Secondly, this study 
documents the significant role of institutional characteristics and culture dimensions on 
accounting choice. As shown in this study, banks from less-developed countries are more 
likely to use Level 3 inputs. This can have a substantial impact on accounting quality. Those 
countries (such as China and Brazil in this study) have less liquid capital markets on which fair 
value estimates can be based and they have poor legal enforcement and investors from such 
countries have fewer rights against insiders (e.g. managers and directors). Therefore, if 
financial institutions are able to use the discretion available under Level 3 inputs for earnings 
and capital adequacy managements, the consequences on investors can be severe. Last, results 
from this study provide valuable inputs to the accounting standard setters, reinforcing the 
evidence (Ball, 2006) already available that adoption of uniform accounting standards, without 
considering the institutional features, will not be able to significantly improve accounting 
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quality or change the financial reporting incentives. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
background. Section 3 reviews relevant prior research and develops hypotheses. Section 4 
outlines the models and describes the variables. Section 5 provides details on the sample 
selection procedures. Section  6  presents  the  analysis  of  the  results.  Section  7  summarises  the  
robustness   tests.   Section   8   provides   concluding   comments   and   addresses   limitations   of   the  
study. 
 
2.  Institutional  Background 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) began its work on financial 
instruments in 1988 and the subject has remained on the active international standard-setting 
agenda ever since. IASC released International Accounting Standard 32 (IAS 32) Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation in 1995. That was an initial standard dealing with 
the presentation and disclosure issues on financial instruments. After a prolonged period of 
increased effort, IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was issued in 
1999 to deal with the recognition and other measurement issues that have not been covered in 
IAS 32. In 2002, in response to practice issues identified in the IAS 39 implementation 
guidance process by audit firms, national standard setters, regulators and others, the IASB 
proposed changes to both IAS 32 and IAS 39. It issued revised versions of those standards in 
December 2003. In August 2005, the IASB expanded the disclosure aspects of IAS 32 and IAS 
39 by issuing International Financial Reporting Standard 7 (IFRS 7) Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures, incorporating disclosure requirements under FAS 157.   
 
 
6 
Fair value, under IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement is defined as ‘the  price  that  would  be  
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market 
participants   at   the  measurement   date.’ The definition emphasises that fair value is more a 
market-based measurement than an entity-specific measurement. Thus, fair values may be 
determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in valuing the asset or 
liability. 
As part of the IASB's response to the global financial crisis, in  March  2009,   the   IASB  
issued ‘Improving  Disclosures  about  Financial  Instruments  (Amendments  to  IFRS  7 Financial  
Instruments:  Disclosures)’. IFRS 7 requires reporting entities to disclose fair values based on a 
Three-Level measurement hierarchy in order to provide financial statements users with useful 
information about valuations, methodologies and the uncertainty associated with fair value 
measurements. While Level 1 measurement includes observable inputs such as quoted prices 
of identical assets or liabilities from active markets, Level 2 measures include indirectly 
observable inputs such as quoted prices of comparable assets and liabilities from active 
markets. However, there  can  be  two  sub-classes  of  Level  2  inputs.  Ryan  (2008,  p.29)  says:   
‘The   first   subclass   is   quoted   market   prices   from   similar   assets   traded   in   active  
markets.  These  measurements  are  considered  to  be  less  ideal  than  Level  1  inputs  but  still  
reliable   as   they   are   based   on   observable   inputs  which   are   less   subjective.   The   second  
subclass  is  indirect  inputs  such  as  yield  curves,  exchange  rates  and  empirical  correlations.  
The  second  subclass  input  has  lower  quality  than  the  first  subclass  of  Level  2  inputs  but  is  
of  higher  quality  than  Level  3  inputs’.  
However,  the  far  less  precise  Level 3 measures include unobservable inputs computed  
by   using   price   models   or   discounted   cash   flow   methodologies   or   other   information  
reflecting   reporting   entity’s   own   assumptions   and   judgments.   These   inputs   are   more  
subject  to  managements’  manipulations,  and  involve  more  information  risks  to  whom  the  
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financial  statements  are  presented.  The  IASB  limits  the  use  of  Level  3  inputs  to  only  when  
inputs  from  Level  1  and  Level  2  are  not  available. 
As fair value estimates based on Level 3 inputs are subject to a lot of estimations, IFRS 7 
requires additional disclosures in relation to Level 3 assets and liabilities. Specifically, for fair 
value measurements in Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, entities need a reconciliation from 
the beginning balances to the ending balances, disclosing separately changes during the period 
attributable to the following: (a)  total gains or losses for the period recognised in profit or loss, 
and a description of where they are presented in the statement(s) of profit or loss and other 
comprehensive income;  (b)  purchases, sales, issues and settlements (each type of movement 
disclosed separately); and (c) transfers into or out of Level 3 (e.g. transfers attributable to 
changes in the observability of market data) and the reasons for those transfers. In addition, for 
fair value measurements in Level 3, if changing one or more of the inputs to reasonably 
possible alternative assumptions would change fair value significantly, the entity shall state 
that fact and disclose the effect of those changes. The entity shall disclose how the effect of a 
change to a reasonably possible alternative assumption was calculated (e.g. Level 3 sensitivity 
analysis)3.  
 
3.  Literature  Review  and  Hypotheses  Development 
The issue of reliability with fair values rises from the measurement uncertainty. The fair 
value estimates, especially for Level 3 assets, are heavily reliant on valuation estimation 
models and assumptions, which may result in unintentional and intentional bias. For example, 
                                                             
3  See  Appendix  A  from  a  sample  bank’s  disclosure  on  fair  value  hierarchy. 
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Benston  (2008,  p.  106)  claimed  that  ‘dishonest  and  opportunistic  CFOs  and  CEOs  are  likely  to  
find  fair  value  accounting  a  boon  to  their  efforts  to  manipulate  reported  net  income.’  Several  
empirical studies have evidenced deliberate managerial bias in fair value accounting (Dietrich 
et al., 2000; Hodder, Mayew, McAnally & Weaver, 2006; Danbolt & Rees, 2008; Ramanna, 
2008). In addition, previous studies have supported the argument that assessing the fair market 
value involves subjectivity. Hence, a high degree of judgment is required when measuring fair 
value estimates. More generally, the demand for fair value has to be evaluated in its specific 
country context. For example, countries should have specific conditions such as liquid markets 
and a large database of available prices for firms to adopt fair value accounting (Barth & 
Landsman, 1995; Ball, 2006).  
3.1 Accounting Choices: Firm-level Determinants 
Fields et al., (2001, p. 260) define an accounting choice as: ‘any decision whose primary 
purpose is to influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting system in a 
particular way, including not only financial statements published in accordance with GAAP, 
but also tax returns and regulatory filings, contracting, asset pricing, taxes, and regulations’.  
The  topic  of  accounting  choice  has  been  extensively  studied  by  researchers  in  prior  studies.  
The foundation studies of accounting choice are offered by Watts & Zimmerman (1978) and 
Holthausen (1990) (see also Fields et al., 2001 for a review). These studies provide early 
evidence that accounting choices are determined by (a) contractual efficiency (agency costs), 
(b) information asymmetry and (c) managerial opportunism reasons (Quagli & Avallone, 
2010). 
In contrast to normative accounting theory that prescribes the accounting method that 
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companies should be adopting, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) developed Positive Accounting 
Theory (PAT) in an attempt to explain why certain companies choose specific accounting 
choices over others. Positive accounting theory  assumes  that  management’s  incentives  are  the  
main determinants of accounting choices. Under the opportunistic perspective of positive 
accounting theory, management is expected to choose an accounting option that will meet their 
wealth maximisation objectives. Thus, certain firm characteristics could possibly determine 
management’s  decisions,  such  as  a bonus plan, leverage and company size. It is hypothesised 
that management will choose an income increasing choice that could positively affect their 
compensation and avoid the violation of debt covenants, whereas in order to avoid political 
costs and political visibility, management is expected to choose income decreasing accounting 
methods. Following the discussions above, this study develops the firm-level determinants 
hypotheses based on positive accounting theory:  
  
Leverage 
Although large banks may prefer to show lower income, many banks would prefer to show 
higher income. One of the three main hypotheses of positive accounting theory is the debt 
hypothesis  that  explains  the  impact  of  company’s  leverage ratio on accounting choices. Mostly, 
debt covenants require borrowers to maintain a minimum level of debt-to-equity, interest 
coverage or working capital. Borrowers will incur costs if debt covenants requirements are 
violated. Under IFRS 7, realised and unrealised gains or losses from Level 3 financial assets 
and liabilities will influence the income statements, which will ultimately affect the 
calculations of convenant ratios. According to agency theory, firms with high leverage ratios, 
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especially those that have almost reached the debt covenant limit, are more likely to use Level 
3 valuation inputs because increasing reported net income will reduce the probability of default. 
These arguments lead to hypothesis two: 
H1:  Bank’s  leverage  ratio  is  positively  associated  with  the  percentage  of  Level  3  financial  
assets and liabilities. 
 
Performance 
Performance is another determinant of accounting choice.  Prior  studies  provide  evidence  that  
manipulating  loan  loss  provisions  and  write-offs  has  been  the  commonly-used  way  by  banks  to  
either  meet   earnings   targets   or   to   avoid   earnings  decreases   and   losses.   For   instance,  Henry  
(2009)  shows   that  early  adopters  elect   the  fair  value  option   in  a  manner   that  systematically  
improves   their   income   statements   in   the   adoption   quarter.   Song (2008) finds that the 
transitional provisions with respect to the application of the fair value option (in accordance 
with FAS 159) are used to remove accumulated losses on investment securities. In addition, 
Song (2008) finds that banks report earnings higher than target by managing them with the fair 
value option. Beatty,  Ke  &  Petroni  (2002)  provide  evidence  that  the  earnings  incentive  is  more  
pronounced   for   public   banks   that   report   more   small   earnings   increases   and   less   earnings  
decreases.   
Moreover,  studies  have  also  provided  empirical  evidence  that  bank  managers  manipulate  
earnings  through  realised  or  unrealised  gains  and  losses  from  financial  instruments.  Following  
the  application  of  FAS  157  in  the  US,  a  recent  study  by  Fietcher,  Myers  &  Shakspeare  (2009) 
examines whether the discretion available in the use of fair value measurement is used for the 
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purpose of big bath accounting during the financial crisis. Based on a sample of 552 US bank 
holding companies and hand-collected data on unrealised Level 3 gains or losses for the time 
period from Q1 2008 to Q1 2009, they find that banks exhibiting poor pre-managed 
performance levels report significantly higher discretionary Level 3 losses. Furthermore, these 
banks are more likely to switch in the subsequent quarter from non-managed negative earnings 
to reported positive earnings, which is consistent with the big bath hypothesis.  Dechow,  Myers  
&  Shakspeare  (2010)  provide  evidence  that  firms  with  low  pre-managed  earnings  or  negative  
changes  in  earnings  report  more  gains  on  securitised  receivables  at  fair  values.  Results  from  
these  studies  suggest  that  managers  manipulate  the  fair  value  of  instruments  to  meet  earnings  
targets   or   to   avoid   losses.   Level   3   valuations   provide   managers   with   discretions   to   boost  
earnings   because   unrealised   gains   on   Level   3   financial   assets   increase   reported   earnings.  
Therefore,  banks  can  opportunistically  choose  to  classify  more  financial  assets  as  Level  3  for  
earnings  management  purposes.  That  is,  poorly  performing  banks  are  more  like  to  use  Level  3  
valuations  to  increase  their  reported  earnings.  Thus,  it  is  hypothesed  that: 
H2: Bank performance is negatively associated with the percentage of Level 3 financial assets 
and liabilities. 
 
Capital  Adequacy 
Capital adequacy is the major indication of the financial strength and long-term viability of 
a bank. Following  the  global  financial  crisis  and  failures  of  financial   institutions,  managing  
capital  adequacy  has  been  a  core  task  for  banks’  management.  Failure  to  meet  capital  adequacy  
requirements   can   be   costly   for   banks   and   lead   to   mandatory   sanctions   by   regulators.   The  
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findings  of  extant  literature  suggest  that  maintaining  a  satisfactory  capital  adequacy  ratio  has  
been  one  of  the  main  incentives  for  bank  managers  to  engage  in  earnings  management.  For  
instance,  using  the  discretion  available  under  the  loan  loss  provisions  and  charge-offs  is  found  
to  be  a  favourable  way  to  manage  capital  adequacy  by  banks.  An  early  study  by  Moyer  (1990)  
examines  a  commercial  bank  manager's  incentives  to  reduce  regulatory  costs  imposed  when  
the  bank's  capital  adequacy  ratio  falls  below  its  regulatory  minimum.  Results  are  consistent  
with   the   hypotheses   that   banks   use   the   discretion   available   under   loan   loss   provisions   to  
manage  capital  adequacy  ratios.  Beatty,  Chamberlain  and  Magliolo  (1995)  find  that  both  loan  
loss  provisions  and  charge-offs  are  used   to  manage  capital   ratios.4  Evidence  outside   the  US  
was  provided  by  Chen  &  Daley   (1996)  who   report   a   consistent   result   that  Canadian  banks  
manage  their  capital  through  loan  loss  reserves  similar  to  the  US  banks. 
Two   recent   studies   provide   empirical   evidence   that   banks   manage   capital   ratios   by  
increasing   the   income   components   (Karaoglu,   2005   and   Huizingga   &   Laeven,   2009).  
Accordingly,   manipulating   the   estimated   Level   3   fair   values   can   have   economically  
meaningful   consequences   for   capital   management   purposes   because   unrealised   gains   from  
Level  3  financial  assets  will  be  increasing  the  net  income  components  on  financial  statements.  
Therefore,  bank  managers  can  maintain  capital  ratios  by  reporting  a  higher  level  of  Level  3  
assets   or   transferring  Level   1   and  Level   2   into  Level   3,   providing  managers  with   a   higher  
degree  of  discretion  when  estimating  the  fair  values.  Thus,  these  arguments  lead  to  following  
hypotheses: 
H3: Bank capital ratio is negatively associated with the percentage of Level 3 financial assets 
                                                             
4  Similar  results  are  also  documented  in  Ahmed,  Takeda  &  Thomas  (1999),  Scholes,  Wilson  &  Walfson  (1990)  
and  Collins,  Shackelford  &Whalen  (1995). 
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and liabilities. 
 
Audit  Committee  Independence 
The perceived reliability of fair value estimates is dependent on the level of discretion 
management has over the valuation process. Level 3 financial assets and liabilities are based on 
unobservable inputs, resulting in unintentional measurement bias or even intentional bias from 
earnings management (Martin et al., 2006). The  audit  committee’s  main  responsibility   is   to  
ensure the reliability and quality of financial reporting. Arguably, the composition of the audit 
committee plays  a  significant  role  in  constraining  the  management’s  opportunistic  behaviour 
with respect to fair value estimates. For instance, studies provide evidence that the 
independence of the audit committee is negatively associated with the occurrence of 
restatements and fraud (Abbott et al., 2006 and Dechow et al., 1996), aggressive earnings 
management (Bedard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002b and Zhou & Chen, 2004). This study expects 
that managers will make use of the discretion available under Level 3 valuation inputs for 
earnings management purposes. The incentives for using Level 3 inputs are constrained by the 
strength of the corporate governance mechanisms. Thus, 
H4: The independence of audit committee members is negatively associated with the 
percentage of Level 3 financial assets and liabilities. 
 
3.3 Institutional Determinants of Financial Reporting Incentives 
An emerging literature investigates how the institutional factors can affect the actual financial 
reporting incentives of financial statement preparers (Ball, Kothari & Robin 2000; Ball, Robin 
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& Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; Ball, Robin & Sadka, 2006; and Shen & Chih, 
2005). This literature suggests that the actual reporting behaviour is endogenous. That is, the 
actual reporting incentives are jointly determined with the country’s   real   economic   and  
political factors. The relevance of this literature to IFRS implementation is that merely 
adopting an exogenously-developed set of accounting standards is unlikely to materially 
change  firms’  actual  reporting  behaviour.  Ball (2006, p.18) argues that given that  
‘uniform accounting would only occur under perfectly integrated world markets and 
political systems  ….adopting uniform international standards would have some, but 
limited, success in overcoming national differences in the real economic and political 
factors that determine actual practice, and hence in reducing differences in financial 
reporting  practice’.   
Indeed, the demand for fair value and reliability of financial statements in common law 
countries can be different from the same demand in code law countries (Ball et al., 2000).5 The 
results from LaPorta (1998) provide evidence that countries with English common law legal 
systems tend to have: (1) better economic development and stronger capital markets, (2) 
stronger investor rights and (3) better legal enforcement than code law countries. 
The institutional differences between common-law and code-law countries in legal 
enforcement, economic development and investor protection have been applied into many 
recent accounting studies. For example, Ball et al. (2000) show that common-law accounting 
income exhibits significantly greater timeliness than code-law accounting income. The notion 
behind  the  results  is  that  investors  from  common  law  countries  are  presumed  as  outsiders  ‘at  
arm’s   length’   from   the   company, and they rely on timely public disclosure and financial 
                                                             
5  Ball et al. (2006) summarises the distinct institutional features between common law countries and code law countries 
‘Common  law  takes  its  name  from  the  process  whereby  laws  originate  and  arises  from  what  is  commonly  accepted  to  be  
appropriate practice. Common law originated in England and spread to its former colonies such as US, Canada, Australia, and 
New  Zealand.  Whereas,  code  law  also  takes  its  name  from  the  process  whereby  laws,  are  ‘coded’  in  the  public  sector.  Code  law  
originated in Continental Europe and spread to the former colonies of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Politically powerful stakeholder groups necessarily are represented in both codifying and implementing rules in code law 
countries. Unlike code law, common law in its purest form makes standard-setting a private-sector  responsibility’. 
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reporting. As a result, earnings are more volatile, more informative, and more closely-followed 
by investors and analysts in common law countries than in code law countries.  
The literature also suggests that institutional factors have a moderating effect on the 
earnings management. For instance, Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki (2003) examines systematic 
differences in earnings management across 31 countries. This study provides evidence that 
earnings management is decreasing in countries with strong investor protection because strong 
protection   limits   insiders’   ability   to   acquire   private   control   benefits,   which   reduces   their  
incentives to mask firm performance. The results suggest an endogenous link between 
corporate governance and the quality of reported earnings. Similarly, Shen & Chih (2005) 
show that more than two-thirds of banks from 48 countries are found to have managed their 
earnings. In addition, they find that stronger protection of investors and greater transparency in 
accounting   disclosure   can   reduce   banks’   incentives   to   manage   earnings.   Also,   market  
development, measured by real GDP per capita, decreases the degree of earnings management. 
Finally, stronger enforcement of laws can counterintuitively result in stronger earnings 
management. However, this effect appears in low-income countries only, and not in 
high-income countries. Based on  a sample of firms from 42 countries, Francis and Wang (2008) 
find that earnings quality is higher in countries whose investor protection is stronger.  
To test the institutional determinants of fair value hierarchy classification choices, this 
study selects a number of institutional proxies that have good empirical grounding in the recent 
accounting literature such as law of region, legal enforcement, investor rights and market 
development (Ball, Kothari & Robin 2000; Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 
2003; Ball, Robin & Sadka, 2006; and Shen & Chih, 2005). Generally, economic development 
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and stronger capital markets, stronger investor rights and better legal enforcement can provide 
investors with some protections from the adverse effects of management discretion thus 
helping to reduce agency problems. However, Leuz et al (2003) also suggest a competing 
hypothesis, the penalty hypothesis that alternatively argues that ‘a strong legal environment 
encourages  earnings  management,  because  negative  earnings  incur  an  authority’s  penalty.  The  
insider thus has a greater incentive to hide a profit loss when faced with greater expected 
penalties. Therefore, earnings management increases with  a  strengthening  of  a  country’s  legal  
protection’  (Shen  &  Chih, 2005, p. 2679). Level 3 inputs are discretionary in nature. Based on 
the competing arguments, it is expected that the use of Level 3 inputs to measure financial 
assets and liabilities are associated with the development of capital markets, legal systems and 
enforcements and stronger investor protection. However, the direction is not predicted. Thus,  
H5: The institutional factors (capital market development, legal system and enforcement, 
outside investor rights) are associated with the use Level 3 inputs to measure their financial 
assets and liabilities.  
 
3.4 Does Culture Matter? 
Culture classification and the differences between them have long been postulated. Based 
on the data from more than 116,000 questionnaires answered by employees of a large 
multinational corporation in 72 countries, Hofstede (1980) found four factors can explain 
differences in nations’  cultural  values:  individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
and masculinity. Uncertainty avoidance measures the extent to which people in a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. Power distance is   defined  as   ‘the   extent   to  
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which less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expectant 
accept that power is distributed unequally’.   Individualism measures the importance of 
individuals versus groups in society. Masculinity measures the extent to which masculine-type 
attitudes are preferred over feminine-type attitudes in a society. Based on Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, Gray (1988) developed the four accounting value dimensions: statutory control 
versus professional regulation of accounting, uniformity versus flexibility of accounting rules, 
conservatism versus optimism in accounting measurement, and transparency versus secrecy in 
accounting disclosures.  
Using Hofstede’s   (1980)   cultural   dimensions   and/or   Gray’s   (1988)   accounting   value  
scores, recent studies provide evidence that culture dimensions and values are associated with 
the earnings quality. For example, Doupnik (2008) has examined the impact of national culture 
on earnings management using a sample from 31 countries. This study finds that cultural 
dimensions explain the variation in earnings management and income smoothing. Similarly, 
controlling for legal enforcement and outside investor rights measure per LaPorta et al. (1998), 
Braun and Rodriguez (2008) find  a  positive  relationship  between  earnings  management  and  
Gray's  (1988)  accounting  values  of  statutory  control,  uniformity,  conservatism,  and  secrecy. 
Gray (1988) argues that the cultural dimensions identiﬁed  by  Hofstede  (1980)  can  have  an  
impact  on  a  country’s  accounting  system  either  through  their  inﬂuence  on  a  country’s  
institutions  or  through  their  inﬂuence  on  accounting  values.  The  level  of  secrecy  in  a  culture  is  
particularly relevant in this study. Firms from countries with a higher secrecy level are likely to 
engage in more earnings management as the financial reporting is less transparent (e.g. to hide 
or avoid losses) in these countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Therefore, if a country ranks high in 
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secrecy, the accounting information system might provide a greater opportunity for earnings 
management.  Accordingly,  Level  3  valuations  inputs  are  unobservable;;  as  a  result,  banks  from  
secrecy-orientated  countries  can  engage  in  earnings  management  more  easily,  which  leads  to  
hypothesis  7:  
H6: Banks from countries with a higher secrecy orientation are more likely to use Level 3 
valuation inputs. 
 
4. Research Design and Sample: 
4.1 Research Design 
This study uses a pooled ordinary least squares regression model of the percentage of net 
financial assets classified as Level 3 (L3%) at each year end on proxies for constructs of 
interest (firm-level and country-level determinants) and the control variables. Equations below 
represent the empirical models this study estimates. Equation 1 includes only firm-level 
determinants. Equation 2-6 includes one of five country-level determinants, on at a time, into 
equation 1: 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit +b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit+ Fixed 
effects+e…………………………............................................................Equation  (1) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6GDPit+ 
Fixed  effects+e……………………………………………………….…..Equation  (2) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6Commonit+ 
Fixed effects+e………………………………………………………...…..Equation  (3) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit 
+b6LegalEnforcementit+Fixedeffects+e……………………………..…...Equation  (4) 
 
L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6InvestorRightsit+Fixed 
effects+e………………………………….……………………………….Equation (5) 
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L3%it =b0 + blLGTAit+ b2LEVit+b3NIit+ b4Tier1it-1+b5ACIit +b6Secrecyit+ 
Fixed effects+e……………………………………………………….…..Equation  (6) 
 
Dependent Variable6: 
Level of net financial assets classified as Level 3 (L3%) 
The dependent variable in all models is the percentage of net financial assets valued using 
Level 3 inputs (L3%). This variable is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of 
Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 liabilities) divided by net fair value assets of Level 
1, Level 2 and Level 3. 
Firm-Level Independent Variables: 
Bank Size (LGTA): 
As discussed earlier, this study predicts that the bank size is positively associated with the 
level of net Level 3 financial assets. The proxy for bank size is total assets, which is measured 
as the log of total assets reported by the bank at year end. The coefficient b1 is expected to be 
positive. 
 
Financial Leverage (LEV): 
This  study  predicts  that  banks  that  have  almost  reached  the  debt  covenant  limit  are  more  
likely  to  classify  their  financial  assets  as  Level  3,  which  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  debt  
covenant   ratios   in   order   to   reflect   firms’   higher   creditworthiness.   Financial   leverage   is  
measured  as  total  debts  divided  by  total  assets.  The  coefficient  b2  is  expected  to  be  positive. 
Performance (NI): 
                                                             
6  Appendix  B  outlines  the  measurement  of  variables. 
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This study predicts poorly-performed banks are more likely to engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. Net income is used  to  proxy  for  a  firm’s  profitability  
and  this  study  expects  that  there  is  a  negative  association  between  banks’  net  income  and  the  
likelihood of using Level 3 inputs for valuing their financial assets and financial liabilities. 
Thus, b3 and b4 is expected to negative. 
Capital Adequacy (Tier1): 
This  study  uses  banks’  Tier  1  Regulatory  Capital  Ratios  (Tier1)  to  proxy  for  banks’  reporting  
incentives for their capital management. The Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio is calculated as 
the bank’s   equity   capital   to   total   risk-weighted assets. The Tier 1 ratio is an important 
indication of the financial strength of financial intuitions. Thus, this study predicts that banks 
with higher Tier 1 capital ratios have fewer incentives to use Level 3 inputs to report 
opportunistically. This study employ the Tier 1 Regulatory Capital Ratio from the prior year 
(t-1) in our analyses because it provides a better indication  of  the  bank’s  financial  health  at  the  
beginning   of   the   year,   and   therefore,   a   better   indication   of   the   bank’s   incentives   to   report  
opportunistically during the current year. Tier 1 rations are downloaded from the Bankscope 
database and the coefficient b4 is expected to negative. 
 
Audit Committee Independence (ACI): 
Extant research provides evidence that an independent audit committee can reduce the agency 
costs. Audit committee independence is measured as the percentage of independent board of 
directors on the board of audit committee. The coefficient b5 is expected to be negative. 
Country-Level Independent Variables: 
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i. Per-capital GDP: Similar to Leuz et al., (2003), in order to ascertain whether fair value 
hierarchy  classification  choice  is  driven  by  a  country’s  economic  development,    this  study  
uses per-capita  GDP  as  an  explanatory  variable,  which  is  country’s  average  per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012. 
ii. Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise.  
iii. Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La 
Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, 
and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 0 to 10.  
iv. Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It is an 
aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six. 
v. Secrecy is measured as a mathematical combination of Hofstede (1980) four cultural 
dimensions of uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism and masculinity. 
Specifically,   the  secrecy  score  for  each  country  is   the  sum  of  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  
uncertainty  avoidance  and  power  distance  minus  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  individualism 
and masculinity (Braun & Rodriquez, 2008).  
 
Control Variables: 
Bank size is included as a control variable. As well, equations are estimated as a fixed 
effects model with year specific dummy variables to control for systematic time period effects 
and country dummies to provide additional controls for omitted variables that could affect the 
fair value hierarchy classification choice.  
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5. Sample  
The  original  sample  is  obtained  from  the  Bankscope  database,  which  comprises  the  top  50  
non-US   banks   worldwide   that   have   adopted   IFRS.   The   reason   this   study   chooses   non-US  
banks   is   to   investigate   any   institutional   factors   that   will   determine   the   accounting   choice.  
Previous   studies   mainly   focus   on   US   banks   because   of   the   data   availability.   Studying  
international  banks  contributes  to  the  existing  literature  on  accounting  choice  and  international  
accounting  standards  adoption.   
All  entities  are  mandatorily  required  to  disclosure  fair  value  hierarchy  for  their  fair  value  
measurements  under  the  IFRS  7  -  Financial  instruments:  disclosure.  This  study  focuses  only  
on  the  banking  industry  for  the  following  reasons.  Banks  normally  have  significant  amounts  of  
fair  value  assets  and  liabilities  which  are  applicable  under  IFRS  7  disclosure  requirements  and  
bank’s  fair  value  measurements  are  usually  more  homogenous  than  firms  in  other  industries.  
Thus,   the   fair   value   estimations   and   fair   value   hierarchy   classification   choices   can   have  
substantial  direct  impact  on  the  banks’  earnings  and  its  regulatory  capital  adequacy.  Studying  
banks’  fair  value  measurement  choices  can  contribute  to  the  debate  on  the  role  of  fair  value  
accounting.  In  this  study,  the  largest  50  non-US  banks  are  chosen  which  offers  the  power  to  test  
the  hypotheses.  Fair  value  hierarchy  disclosure  requirements  under  IFRS  7  would  be  effective  
for  banks  from  the  1st  January,  2009.  Therefore,  the  sample  period  for  this  study  starts  from  
2009  until  the  end  of  2012  inclusive.   
Each  bank’s  annual  IFRS  7  disclosure  information  for  2009-2012  is  hand-collected  from  
their   annual   reports.   All   the   financial   information   of   those   banks   is   downloaded   from   the  
bankscope  database.  Then,  bank-year observations with missing values for any of test variables 
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have been excluded. Finally, observations that fall in the top and bottom 1% of variables have 
been eliminated. The finial sample for tests consists of 146 bank-year observations associated 
with 50 unique banks. The sample selection procedure is outlined in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the relative size of fair value assets and liabilities 
from 146 bank-year observations over the sample periods (2009-2012). Compared to total 
assets and total liabilities, the mean of total assets and liabilities measured at the fair value are 
about 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively. The fair value amounts under Level 2 inputs 
account for most fair values, which is consistent with a few recent studies (Song et al, 2010). 
Specifically, 66% of fair valued assets and 86% of fair valued liabilities are classified as Level 
2. Whereas, only 5% fair valued assets and 8% fair valued liabilities are based on Level 3 
inputs. The mean of net Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 assets are 55%, 35% and 10% 
respectively. 
The descriptive statistics shows that the sample covers a wide range of banks. The mean of 
total assets of sample banks is USD 941525.35 million, ranging from a minimum of USD 
184298.14 million to a maximum of USD 2964299.20 million. On average, the companies in 
the sample have total liabilities of approximately 94% of their assets. In terms of the 
profitability of these banks, on average, the net income is USD 4560 million, which indicates 
that more than 50% of banks in the sample made an accounting profit. In addition, descriptive 
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statistics demonstrates that sample banks have a comparatively high Tier 1 regulatory ratio of 
10.76% on average, suggesting a strong debt pay-off ability of these banks. Lastly, in term of 
corporate governance, all banks are audited by Big4 firms7 and around 85% of the audit 
committee members are considered to be independent on average.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 illustrates the level of L3 assets and liabilities over the sample periods (2009-2012). 
The table shows that the percentage of Level 3 assets and liabilities has been gradually 
increasing over years in countries such as Australia, Canada, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Sweden 
and Switzerland. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, in countries such as Brazil, China, 
Korea and Spain, there was a slightly increase in Level 3 assets and liabilities from 2009-2011 
followed by a sharp decrease in percentage of Level 3 assets and liabilities from 2011-2012. 
[Insert Table 3] 
In terms of the country-level variables, 5 sample countries are common law countries 
(Australia, Canada, UK, Ireland and Singapore), whereas 13 come from code law legal system. 
In general, the per-capital GDP shows that all European countries, Canada and Australia are 
well-developed countries. In addition, Singapore and Korea have comparative high per-capital 
GDP from the Asia region whereas China and Brazil have comparatively low per-capital GDP. 
The Switzerland (9.99), Sweden (9.92) and Netherlands (9.87) have the highest scores on the 
legal enforcement index, while China (4.77) and Brazil (6.52) have the lowest scores. Brazil 
(5), Canada (5) and UK (5) have the highest outside investor rights as per La Porta et al. (1998) 
                                                             
7  All  sample  banks  are  audited  by  Big  4.  Thus,  it  is  not  included  in  the  descriptive  statistics  as  there  are  no  
variations  across  banks. 
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measure, whereas Belgium (0), Germany (1) and Italy (1) have the lowest outside investor 
protection index. For the national culture variable (Secrecy), Korea (46), Germany (29), Spain 
(20) and Italy (19) have the highest scores, while Austria (-75) and Sweden (-68) have the 
lowest scores based on Hofstede (1980) measure. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Pearson correlation coefficients on the variables used in each of the tests are presented in 
Table 5. L3% is positively correlated with determinants such as LGTA, LEV and Secrecy. It is 
negatively correlated with Tier 1, ACI and Outside Investor Rights as hypothesized (two tailed 
p-value 0.01 and 0.05 level). Correlation matrix  demonstrates that Common Law is strongly 
positively correlated with per-Capital GDP, Legal Enforcement and Investor rights, signifying 
that common law countries are well-developed countries whose laws are better enforced and 
investors are better protected (Ball et al, 2006).  
[Insert Table 5] 
 
6.2. Main analysis 
 
The results of the regression analyses for the pooled samples are presented in Table 6. The 
significance levels of individual coefficients are reported as two-tailed p-values. Column 1 
reports results from only firm-level variables to ensure that any finding is not affected by 
correlations with country-level variables incorporated in the model. The dependent variable in 
all models is the percentage of net financial assets valued using Level 3 inputs (L3%).  
Results provide support for hypothesis 1 that banks with high leverage ratios are more 
likely to classify their financial assets and liabilities as Level 3. The coefficient on LEV is 
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significantly positive (coefficient=0.321, t-stat=3.736) at 1% level. This result can be 
explained by debt hypothesis that highly levered banks are   more   likely   to   classify   their  
financial  assets  as  Level  3,  which  will  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  debt  covenant  ratios,  in  order  
to  reflect  firms’  higher  creditworthiness  and  to  avoid  the  violation  of  debt  covenant  limit.   
Hypothesis   2   is   also   supported.   That   is,   the   incentive   to   classify   financial   assets   and  
liabilities  as  Level  3  is  negatively  associated  with  the  bank’s  profitability.  The  coefficient  on  
net   income   (NI)   is   negative   (coefficient=-0.211,   t-stat=-2.013),   suggesting   that   better  
performing  banks  classify  less  percentage  of  fair  valued  assets  based  Level  3  inputs.  In  another  
word,   profitable   banks   have   less   incentive   to   hide   their   losses   to   Level   3   assets.   This   is  
consistent  with  the  result  from  a  recent  study  by  a  recent  study  by  Fietcher,  Myers  &  Shakspear  
(2009)  who  find  that  poorly  performing  banks  are  more  likely  to  report  less  unrealised  losses  
from  Level  3  assets  in  the  period  during  which  a  negative  earnings  is  reported.   
This  study  finds support for hypothesis 3. The coefficient on Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio 
(Tier1) is negative and significant (coefficient=-0.149, t-stat=-1.946) and the sign is consistent 
with the prediction. Banks  with  comparatively  low  capital  ratios  will  face  higher  regulatory  
costs.  The  worse,  failing  to  meet  the  capital  adequacy  requirements  can  lead  to  mandatory  
sanctions. This result provides evidence that Level 3 valuations provide managers with 
discretion to manage their capital ratios.   
Finally, in terms of the corporate governance variable, results suggest that Level 3 
classification choice is negatively (coefficient=-0.377, t-stat=-3.640) associated with the 
percentage of independent audit committee members. This findings support the importance of 
corporate governance in valuing Level 3 fair values which likely represent the values with 
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greatest information asymmetry and agency issues. 
When first three country-level variables: Capital market development (Per-capital GDP), 
Law, Legal Enforcement is added, one at a time, to the regression, the firm-level determinants 
remain unchanged. Results are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 6. First, the coefficient of the 
per-capita GDP are significant and negative (coefficient=-0.754, t-stat=-2.003), suggesting the 
fact that banks incentives to measure their fair value based on Level 3 inputs is partially 
affected  by  the  country’s  economic  development.  Second, the regression results show that L3% 
is negatively associated with Common Law and legal enforcement. Interestingly, when 
Outside Investor Rights is added, as shown in the Column 5 of Table 6, the coefficient on net 
income (NI) and Tier 1 become insignificant, suggesting a strong influence of investor 
protection on the choice to use Level 3 valuation inputs. 
The notion behind these findings is that, based on the agency theory, managers and 
controlling shareholders (insiders) have incentives to acquire private control benefits to meet 
their wealth maximum objectives. As discussed in this paper, Level 3 valuations are based on 
unobservable inputs which are highly subjective and less verifiable, providing bankers with 
opportunities to mask the profit figures and manage capital ratios especially when active and 
liquid markets for financial assets do not exist. Results imply that legal systems, legal 
enforcements   and   investor   protections   are  mechanisms   to   constrain  mangers’   incentives   to  
opportunistically choose accounting choices thus negative coefficients on these variables are 
found. These findings are consistent with a recent study by Leuz et al., (2003) who argue that, 
‘the  ability  of  insiders  to  divert  resources  for  their  own  benefit  is  limited  by  legal  systems  that  
protect the rights of outside investors. As outsiders can only take disciplinary actions against 
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insiders if outsiders detect the private benefits, insiders have an incentive to manipulate 
accounting  reports  in  order  to  conceal  their  diversion  activities’.   
Lastly, results presented in column 6 of Table 6 indicate that bankers are more likely to 
classify their fair valued assets and liabilities as Level 3 in countries that are Secrecy-oriented. 
It is note-worthy that when  ‘secrecy’  is  added,  the  adjusted  R2 increases to 58.4%. This finding 
highlights the important influence of culture on accounting choices, which is also consistent 
with the prediction that secrecy-oriented countries tend to have higher information asymmetry 
and offers banks more opportunities for earnings managements as financial reporting in these 
countries is less transparent. 
[Insert Table 6] 
7. Additional Tests 
To ensure that smaller countries with fewer observations do not drive the results, models 
have been re-estimated excluding those having only four or eight firm-year observations. The 
results (not reported) are similar to the results reported in Table 6 both in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance on both the firm- and country-level determinants. Furthermore, the 
results remain valid even after excluding countries with the highest number of observations 
(China, Canada and France). The coefficients on variables of interest in all models are 
statistically significant (two tailed p-value 0.01 or 0.05). 
 
8. Concluding Comments 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors influencing banks’ decisions to employ 
Level 3 inputs in estimating the value of their financial assets and liabilities. Using a sample of 
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146 bank-year observations from 18 countries over 2009-2012, this study finds   banks’  
incentives to use Level 3 valuation inputs are associated with firm-level determinants such as 
leverage, profitability (in term of net income), Tier 1 capital ratio and audit committee 
independence and bank size; and country-level determinants, such as, economy development, 
legal region, legal enforcement and investor rights explain the Level 3 classification choice by 
banks.  Lastly,  ‘secrecy’,  the  proxy  for  culture  dimensions  and  values,  is  found  to  be  positively  
associated with the use of Level 3 valuation inputs. 
The results of this study have important implications to standard setters and contribute to 
the debate on the use of fair value accounting. While the use of fair value accounting increases 
‘true and fair’ disclosures, it may also provide an avenue for earnings management, especially 
when liquid markets do not exist (e.g. Level 3 inputs). In addition, adopting the uniform 
accounting standards can be beneficial to adopters as research shows adoption IFRS increases 
the comparability and reduces costs of capital. However, merely adoption of the uniform 
accounting standards. without considering the institutional features, will not be able to 
significantly improve accounting quality and can provide opportunities for earnings 
management. As shown in this study, banks from the less-developed countries, such as China 
and Brazil, are more likely to use Level 3 inputs but those countries have less liquid markets 
and poor legal enforcement and investors of such countries have fewer rights against insiders 
(e.g. managers and directors). Therefore, if financial institutions are able to use the discretion 
available under Level 3 inputs for earnings and capital adequacy managements, the benefits of 
adopting IFRS will be off-set by the consequences from opportunistic behaviour.  
This study has some limitations. For example, this study focuses on top 50 non-US banks 
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which are larger and have better performance than smaller banks. Thus, the results of this study 
might not be generalisable to smaller banks. Also, this study is exploratory in nature and needs 
to be expanded using a much larger sample of banks. Future research can explore other 
determinants of the choice to use Level 3 valuation inputs and adds knowledge to the existing 
literature on fair value accounting and measurement. 
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Appendix A: An example of the quantitative disclosures on fair value hierarchy under 
IFRS 7 by Deutsche Bank from 2012. 
 
(a) Carry value of the financial instruments based on 3-level fair value measurement hierarchy: 
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(b): Reconciliation of financial instruments classified in Level 3: 
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Appendix B: Measurement of Variables 
 
Variable: Measurement: 
L3% net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of 
Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 
liabilities) divided by net fair value assets 
of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 
LGTA natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV the ratio of total debts over total assets 
NI net income after tax 
Tier 1 the  ratio  of tier  1capital  to  total  
risk-weighted  assets 
ACI the percentage of independent board of 
directors on the board of audit committee 
Per-capital GDP country’s  average  per-capita real GDP 
between 2009 and 2012 
Common a dummy variable, 1 for a common law 
country and 0 otherwise 
Legal Enforcement the mean score across three legal variables 
used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the 
efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an 
assessment of rule of law, and (c) the 
corruption index. All three variables, 
range from 0 to 10 
Outside Investor Rights Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director 
rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It 
is an aggregate measure of (minority) 
shareholder rights and ranges from zero to 
six 
Secrecy the  sum  of  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  
uncertainty avoidance and power distance 
minus  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  
individualism and masculinity 
Fixed effects Year dummy variables and Country 
dummy variables 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
Original Sample ( bank-year observations) 200 
Less:  
Missing values on dependent and independent variables 30 
Top and bottom 1% of control variables 24 
Number of observations used in the tests 146 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm-level regression variables 
 
Variable Mean Stand.  Dev. 1st  Quartile Median 3rd   
Quartile 
Total  Assets  (USD:  
Million) 
941525.35 736233.50 358939.19 655318.53 1494084.55 
Leverage 0.94 0.02 0.93 0.94 0.95 
Net  Income  (USD:  
Million) 
4566.00 7407.09 1486.63 3284.84 6153.65 
Tier  1 10.76 2.07 9.33 10.55 12.18 
ACI 0.85 0.18 0.71 1.00 1.00 
FVA/TA 0.30 0.93 0.06 0.17 0.33 
L1  Assets% 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.24 0.47 
L2  Assets% 0.66 0.24 0.48 0.68 0.86 
L3  Assets% 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.04 
FVL/TL 0.19 0.65 0.01 0.09 0.22 
L1  Liabilities% 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.12 
L2  Liabilities% 0.86 0.42 0.79 0.90 0.96 
L3  Liabilities% 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Net  L1  Assets 0.55 0.60 0.15 0.51 0.86 
Net  L2  Assets 0.35 0.55 0.07 0.42 0.77 
Net  L3  Assets 0.10 0.44 0.00 0.02 0.07 
Table two presents the descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables included in the tests. The full sample 
consists of 146 bank-year observations for the fiscal years 2009 to 2012 across 18 countries. Financial accounting 
information is obtained from the Bankscope Database. Fair value measurement hierarchy information is 
hand-collected from the annual reports. Firm size is measured as total US$ assets (in millions); Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of total debts over total assets; Net income is measured as net income after tax (in millions); 
Tier 1 is measured as   the   ratio  of tier  1capital   to   total   risk-weighted  assets;;  Audit  committee   independence   is  
measured   as   the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; FVA/TA is 
calculated as the total fair valued assets over total assets; L1 Assets%, L2 Assets% and L3 Assets% are measured 
as total Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 assets divided by total fair valued assets, respectively; FVL/TL is calculated 
as the total fair valued liabilities over total liabilities;  L1  Liabilities%,  L2  Liabilities%  and  L3  Liabilities% are 
measured as total Level 1, Level2 and Level 3 liabilities divided by total fair valued liabilities, respectively;  Net  
L1  Assets  Net  L2  Assets  Net  L3  Assets  are  calculated  as  net  Level  1,  net  Level  2  and  net  Level  3  assets  divided  by  
net  fair  valued  assets,  respectively. 
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Table 3: The extent of the use of  Level 3 assets and liabilities over the sample period 
(2009-2012) 
 
 
Table three illustrates the level of Level 3 assets and liabilities over the sample periods (2009-2012). L3A is 
measured as Level 3 assets divided by total net fair value assets; L3L is measured as Level 3 liabilities divided by 
total net fair value assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 
  L3A L3L L3A L3L L3A L3L L3A L3L 
1 Austria 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
2 Australia 0.0075 0.0025 0.005 0.0025 0.01 0.00 0.012 0.006 
3 Belgium 0.155 0.14 0.175 0.155 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.12 
4 Brazil 0.04 0 0.08 0 0.18 0 0.07 0 
5 Canada 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.03 0.034 0.042 0.04 0.06 
6 China 0.022 0.135 0.05 0.183 0.01 0.178 0.013 0.198 
7 France 0.088 0.018 0.104 0.02 0.046 0.028 0.108 0.036 
8 Germany 0.02 0.005 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.015 0.04 0.02 
9 Ireland 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.02 0 
10 Italy 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.035 0.015 0.045 0.035 
11 Netherlands 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 
12 Norway 0.18 0 0.17 0 0.28 0 0.01 0 
13 Korea 0.34 0.53 0.07 0.46 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.33 
14 Singapore 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
15 Spain 0.1925 0.2325 0.1975 0.235 0.0175 0 0.01 0 
16 Sweden 0.0075 0.005 0.0125 0.0075 0.015 0.025 0.0125 0.005 
17 Switzerland 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
18 UK 0.025 0.0125 0.032 0.015 0.03 0.017 0.0325 0.015 
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Table 4: Summary of country-level variables 
 
 Country Per-capital 
GDP  
(2009-2012) 
Common 
Law 
Legal  
Enforcement 
Outside 
Investor 
Rights 
Secrecy 
1 Austria 36277 0 9.47 4 -75 
2 Australia 35058.25 1 9.30 4 -14 
3 Belgium 35576.75 0 9.49 0 8 
4 Brazil 5734.5 0 6.52 5 -3 
5 Canada 31400.25 1 9.58 5 -19 
6 China 4013.75 0 4.77 3 -4 
7 France 32654 0 8.97 3 -10 
8 Germany 32532.5 0 9.37 1 29 
9 Ireland 38646.5 1 8.74 4 5 
10 Italy 26894.75 0 7.95 1 19 
11 Netherlands 37246.75 0 9.87 2 -49 
12 Norway 77162.5 0 9.76 2 -42 
13 Korea 20161.25 0 6.71 2 46 
14 Singapore 35534 1 8.99 4 -35 
15 Spain 23745.75 0 7.87 4 20 
16 Sweden 41076.75 0 9.92 3 -68 
17 Switzerland 38646.5 0 9.99 2 -18 
18 UK 38646.5 1 9.40 5 -23 
The table 4 presents the country-level variables of interest. Per-capital  GDP  is  country’s  average  per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012 (in UD dollars); Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 
otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. 
(1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All 
three variables, range from 0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. 
(1998). It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to six; Secrecy is 
measured  as  the  sum  of  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  uncertainty  avoidance  and  power  distance  minus  its  ‘difference’  
scores for individualism and masculinity. 
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Table  5:  Correlation  Matrix 
Table  5  shows  the  correlations  between  variables. L3% is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of Level 3 assets minus fair values of Level 3 liabilities) divided 
by net fair value assets of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3; Firm size (LGTA) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets ; Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of total 
debts over total assets; Net income (NI) is measured as net income after tax; Tier 1 is measured as  the  ratio  of tier  1capital  to  total  risk-weighted  assets;;  Audit  committee  
independence  (ACI)  is  measured  as  the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; Per-capital  GDP  is  country’s  average  per-capita real 
GDP between 2009 and 2012; Common is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal 
variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 
0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). It is an aggregate measure of (minority) shareholder rights and ranges from zero to 
six; Secrecy is measured  as  the  sum  of  its  ‘difference’  scores  for  uncertainty  avoidance  and  power  distance  minus  its  ‘difference’  scores  for   individualism and masculinity. 
***=significant  at  the  1%  level  (two-tailed  test),  **=significant  at  the  5%  level  (two-tailed  test). 
 
 
 
   L3% LGTA LEV NI Tier  1 ACI Per-capital 
GDP 
Common  
Law 
Legal  
Enforcement 
Investor  
Rights 
Secrecy 
L3% 1                     
LGTA .470*** 1                   
LEV .452*** .387*** 1                 
NI -.115 .324*** -.170** 1               
Tier  1 -.261*** -.042 -.147** .078 1             
ACI -.294*** -.418*** -.162** -.321*** .168** 1           
Per-capital 
GDP 
.123 .013 .281*** -.412*** .105 .328*** 1         
Common  Law -.012 -.164** -.043 -.205*** .156** .485*** .300*** 1       
Legal  
Enforcement 
.103 -.090 .149** -.385*** .156** .394*** .873*** .400*** 1     
Investor  Rights -.183** -.255*** -.035 -.028 .161* .330*** -.084 .665*** .085 1   
Secrecy .149** .100 -.248*** .003 -.100 -.238*** -.396*** -.190*** -.399*** -.324*** 1 
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Table 6: Regressions using pooled sample for testing the firm- and country-level determinants of L3% 
 
Variable   Equation  1 Equation  2 Equation  3 Equation  4 Equation  5 Equation  6 
 Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat Coefficient  
(p-value) 
T-stat 
Constant -9.429*** -4.855 -10.509*** -5.273 -8.181*** -4.344 11.111* 1.866 -4.246** -2.125 -8.178*** -4.688 
LGTA 0.475*** 5.047 0.495*** 5.292 0.465*** 5.180 0.465*** 5.181 0.385*** 4.442 0.432*** 5.136 
LEV 0.321*** 3.736 0.363*** 4.152 0.262*** 3.132 0.262*** 3.132 0.325*** 4.186 0.266*** 3.452 
NI -0.211** -2.013 -0.222** -2.138 -0.226*** -2.252 -0.226*** -2.253 -0.125 -1.302 -0.073 -0.763 
Tier  1 -0.149** -1.946 -0.145** -1.913 -0.142** -1.938 -0.142** -1.939 -0.035 -0.485 -0.166*** -2.429 
ACI -0.377*** -3.640 -0.346*** -3.340 -0.308*** -3.064 -0.308*** -3.065 -0.334*** -3.558 -0.189*** -1.937 
Per-capital 
GDP 
  -0.754** -2.003         
Common   
Law 
    -1.326*** -3.630       
Legal  
Enforcement 
      -16.557*** -3.630     
Outside 
Investor  Rights 
        -2.813*** -5.313   
Secrecy           1.505*** 5.695 
Year  Dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Country  Dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
N 146  146  146  146  146  146  
Adjusted  R2 0.476  0.489  0.524  0.524  0.572  0.584  
The table 6 presents the results from the regression analysis. The dependent variable of all models is L3% which is measured as net Level 3 fair value assets (fair values of Level 3 assets minus fair 
values of Level 3 liabilities) divided by net fair value assets of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3; Firm size (LGTA) is measured as natural logarithm of total assets ; Leverage (LEV) is measured as the 
ratio of total debts over total assets; Net income (NI) is measured as net income after tax; Tier 1 is measured as  the  ratio  of tier  1capital  to  total  risk-weighted  assets;;  Audit  committee  independence  
(ACI)  is  measured  as  the percentage of independent board of directors on the board of audit committee; Per-capital  GDP  is  country’s  average  per-capita real GDP between 2009 and 2012; Common 
is a dummy variable, 1 for a common law country and 0 otherwise; Legal Enforcement is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La Porta et al. (1998): (a) the efficiency of 
the judicial system, (b) an assessment of rule of law, and (c) the corruption index. All three variables, range from 0 to 10; Outside Investor Rights is the anti-director rights index from La Porta et 
al. (1998). It is an aggregate  measure  of  (minority)  shareholder  rights  and  ranges  from  zero  to  six;;  Secrecy  is  measured  as  the  sum  of  its  ‘difference’ scores for uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance   minus   its   ‘difference’   scores   for   individualism   and   masculinity.   ***=significant   at   the   1%   level   (two-tailed   test),   **=significant   at   the   5%   level   (two-tailed   test
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